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ABSTRACT
The second labour of Heracles, the epic struggle with the Hydra, is used in this paper as a metaphor for the 
diffi culties that may be encountered in analysing and measuring social capital. In Greek mythology, the 
Hydra ‘had a prodigious dog-like body, and eight or nine snaky heads, one of them immortal’. In a sense, 
social capital is the intellectual equivalent of the Hydra in that it is conceptualised in many different ways. 
While the many heads of social capital appear relatively harmless compared to the Hydra, the unquestioning 
adoption and application of social capital rhetoric is potentially harmful, especially if it distracts policy 
makers from the real causes of Indigenous poverty and ongoing social exclusion. This paper outlines the 
conceptual and empirical issues that are likely to plague attempts to measure social capital. After discussing 
some possible roles for social capital in describing Indigenous poverty, the paper advocates a modest 
conceptualisation of social capital that focuses on the structure of social networks. Apart from anything 
else, this minimalist position should limit the scope for misunderstandings arising from cross-cultural 
differences in the views about the social, cultural and institutional contexts of such networks. 
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INTRODUCTION
Classical references may have gone out of style in scholarly work, but they can stimulate the imagination of the reader by examining issues indirectly or by analogy. This paper uses the second labour of Heracles, 
the epic struggle with the Hydra, as a metaphor for the diffi culties that may be encountered in analysing 
and measuring social capital. 
In Greek mythology, the Hydra ‘had a prodigious dog-like body, and eight or nine snaky heads, one of them 
immortal; but some credit it with fi fty, or one hundred, or even ten thousand heads. It was so venomous that 
its very breath, or the smell of its tracks, could destroy life’ (Graves 1955: 107–110).1 In a sense, the number 
of heads was immaterial because killing a non-immortal head would only result in two or three growing in 
its place. Note that the Hydra was not all bad, or at least without utility, as part of its immortal head was 
fi lled with gold!
Social capital is the intellectual equivalent of the Hydra in that it is conceptualised in many different ways. 
While the many heads of social capital appear relatively harmless compared to the Hydra, the unquestioning 
adoption and application of social capital rhetoric is potentially harmful, especially if it distracts policy 
makers from the real causes of Indigenous poverty and ongoing social exclusion. This paper refl ects on the 
effi cacy of the construct of social capital as a basis for social policy to reduce Indigenous poverty. 
The ‘many-headed’ nature of social capital is evident in the many streams that come under the auspices of 
the broad concept. In the communitarian tradition it is seen as a public good that is under-invested because 
it is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. For Coleman (1988), it is close to a private good. While for Portes 
(Portes 1998; Portes & Landolt 1996) it bears a resemblance to a club good (i.e. a congestible public good). 
Institutional models of social capital range from a generalised notion of trust to the standard theory of 
property rights. Clearly, social capital is a multifaceted concept that opens the possibility of rationalising 
policy action at a number of levels. Woolcock (2001) documents how social capital has been re-invented 
many times in many different guises. It could be argued without stretching the analogy too far, that some 
of these new ‘heads’ have grown in the place of other older sociological theories.
This paper provides a critical analysis of the theoretical underpinning of social capital, and examines the 
possibility of empirical measurement of the concept(s), and testing of the theory (or more correctly, the 
cluster of theories). To provide a focal point for the analysis, the utility of the notion of social capital will 
be explored in the context of Indigenous Australians, one of the most socially excluded groups of poor and 
disadvantaged people living in a fi rst-world setting. Indigenous Australians provide an extreme test of social 
capital theory that allows us to examine the utility of the concept as a basis for constructive policy. 
The Herculean effort required to make sense of the concept of social capital is not without its rewards since 
it has provided a language for several disciplines (notably sociology, economics and perhaps anthropology) 
2 HUNTER
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
to interact and engage with one another, even though some of the extant communications may have been 
at cross-purposes.2 However, these benefi ts may, arguably be related to the intellectual struggle, rather than 
the notion itself or the supporting analytical structures. 
The remainder of this paper is broken into six sections. First, the unique nature of Indigenous poverty is 
described and a possible role for social capital is briefl y introduced. Second, several unresolved defi nitional 
issues that plague the concept of social capital are discussed. This leads to the third section that outlines 
several theoretical criticisms. Fourth, instrumental empirical issues are raised to highlight the diffi culties 
in operationalising the concept. On a more positive note, the fi nal two sections discuss the utility of the 
concept in Indigenous contexts and highlight some constructive avenues for future research. 
THE NATURE OF INDIGENOUS POVERTY: THE MOTIVATION OF A 
POSSIBLE ROLE FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL
The existing instruments for measuring poverty have become disconnected from the life events that cause 
poverty and deprivation among Indigenous Australians. The concept of income poverty is inadequate, 
with many high-income Indigenous families experiencing as much socioeconomic disadvantage as low 
income families (Hunter 2001). Indeed, Indigenous Australians are so different from other poor (and rich) 
Australians, in terms of the nature and extent of the destitution they experience, that there is a need for 
a separate model of Indigenous disadvantage (Hunter 2001). In a literal sense, many Indigenous people are 
socially excluded from mainstream Australia. 
For analytic purposes, social exclusion can be broadly defi ned as ‘multiple deprivations resulting from a lack 
of personal, social, political or fi nancial opportunities’. While the economist’s notion of poverty is primarily 
focused on contemporary distributional issues, the notion of social exclusion focuses on inadequate social 
participation, lack of social integration, and lack of power (Room 1995). Note that social exclusion is an 
intrinsically dynamic concept, and is descriptive of a condition that develops over time after prolonged 
social isolation and deprivation. In contrast, poverty is a static concept defi ned by whether an individual, 
family or household have suffi cient income at a particular point in time.
The language of social exclusion is appealing as a description of Indigenous poverty. It gives the fl avour 
of entrenched disadvantage being conditioned by historical, social, and cultural circumstances facing 
individuals. The distinguishing feature of the Indigenous poor is the depth of poverty they experience across 
a range of welfare indicators. That is, poor outcomes in various spheres of life are not confi ned to those in 
the Indigenous community conventionally defi ned as poor (i.e., poor in terms of income). Simply increasing 
the fi nancial resources available to the Indigenous poor may not be suffi cient to alleviate their particular 
form of poverty. Living on the margins of ‘Australian’ society for more than 200 years may have generated 
a sense of alienation not easily cured. Perhaps more importantly the multidimensional nature of Indigenous 
poverty means that a direct assault on Indigenous disadvantage is unlikely to be successful—and this has 
profound implications for the effi cacy of the current policy of ‘practical reconciliation’ (Altman & Hunter 
2003). 
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Any enthusiasm for social exclusion as a construct to analyse Indigenous poverty must be tempered by 
the fact that it remains a rather slippery concept that has proved remarkably diffi cult to operationalise 
and measure (Bradshaw 2003). One possibility for adding (theoretical) structure to the analysis of social 
exclusion is to examine the network of relationships, or the lack of networks, in which social exclusion is 
perpetuated. An important theoretical issue in this area has been the development of the concept of ‘social 
capital’—a concept that emphasises not only the structure of social relationships, but also their quality. 
Despite the diversity of uses of the term, social capital can be defi ned broadly as networks of social relations 
which are characterised by norms of trust and reciprocity and which lead to mutually benefi cial outcomes 
(Bourdieu 1993; Coleman 1988). Thus social capital can be understood as a resource for collective action, 
although the nature or ownership of the resource can be disputed. For individuals, this can mean access to 
social connections that help the processes of getting by or getting ahead. For communities, social capital 
refl ects the ability of community members to participate, cooperate, and interact (Putnam 1995). 
Social capital arising from social networks has been classifi ed into three types: bonding, bridging, and 
linking (Woolcock & Narayan 2000). Bonding social capital is said to exist in dense or closed networks (e.g. 
among immediate family and friends), and helps people to ‘get by’ in life on a daily basis. Bridging social 
capital involves overlapping networks that may make resources accessible across various networks. A closely 
related, but arguably distinct concept, is ‘linking’ social capital that involves social relationships with those 
in authority or positions of power, which is also useful for securing resources.
Social capital is not unambiguously positive. Portes (1998) identifi es four possible negative consequences: 
the exclusion of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on freedoms of individuals, 
and downward levelling of norms. For example, if Indigenous social networks are largely confi ned to the 
jobless, then a reduction in expectations can become a self-fulfi lling prophesy whereby people fail to see the 
advantages in gaining further education. This, in turn, diminishes the skill acquisition that facilitates entry 
into the labour market. These issues will be elaborated in the penultimate section of the paper.
The utility of the notion of social capital lies in its fl exibility and its consequent capacity to explain the 
negative spillovers of certain social relationships. That is, not all social networks are equally useful in 
progressing the interests of individuals or, indeed, the group. For example, even if Indigenous job seekers 
have well-developed social networks within the Indigenous community, their contacts may be useless in 
securing work in the mainstream job market. Indeed, social networks in Indigenous communities may 
reinforce individuals’ motivations and ultimately their aspirations. 
While the general notion of social capital shows promise in terms of its ability to explain ongoing Indigenous 
disadvantage, the panoply of defi nitions and lack of theoretical clarity threaten to undermine its potential 
contributions to the policy debate. 
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THE SOCIAL CAPITAL ‘HYDRA’: DEFINITIONAL DIFFICULTIES 
The concept of social capital is sometimes criticised as being too broad to provide a useful theoretical 
framework (Putzel 1997).3 The mechanisms through which social capital can affect a range of outcomes 
need to be made explicit if it is to provide a credible framework for analysis. For example, the benefi ts of 
social capital may be incidental, and not easily modelled or captured by academics or policy-makers. People 
may get jobs through networks of friendship, but they probably do not join networks primarily for this 
purpose (Arrow 2000). 
Despite some agreement from the various disciplines of the main roles and functions of social capital, this 
has not led to a consensus about its conceptualisation (Van Deth 2003). Van Deth claims that the bewildering 
number of different aspects, characteristics, indicators and dimensions of social capital makes a common 
understanding rather unlikely. He quotes the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) (2001: 91) who claim that ‘much of what is relevant to social capital is tacit and relational, defying 
easy measurement or codifi cation’. However, without precise defi nition of social capital, virtually no 
defi nitive conclusions or implications for operationalisation can be deduced.
Some researchers claim that the lack of specifi c a priori defi nitions is an integral part of the conceptualisation 
of social capital. In the case of functional approaches, the exact form of social capital is irrelevant as long 
as it performs the functions (Van Deth 2003: 81). This rationalisation is rather disingenuous (or deluded) 
since it is not possible to claim something is performing a function if one cannot defi ne or identify the 
phenomenon. Stated another way, it is not possible to interpret data without a clearly defi ned theory, so it 
would be impossible to identify whether or not a function was being fulfi lled by ‘social capital’ or something 
else. 
One of the orthodoxies arising in the literature is that one can distinguish between the structural and cultural 
aspects of social capital (Bourdieu 1986,  1993). Connections or networks are seen as structural whereas the 
cultural aspects of social capital are defi ned in terms of the norms, manners and customs related to these 
networks. While this distinction offers the prospect for refi ning the conceptualisation, it is also necessary to 
be clear whether social capital is the ‘property’ of individuals or is a collective good, by defi nition available 
to every citizen (Van Deth 2003). The public good (or public bad) aspect of social capital is likely to be 
particularly relevant for Indigenous Australians for whom reciprocal obligations are a prominent feature of 
social relations (Hunter 2000). 
The view of social capital is either collective or individual in nature is heavily infl uenced by disciplinary 
perspectives. Woolcock (2001: 12), a sociologist with the World Bank, claims that whereas human capital 
resides in individuals, social capital resides in relationships. Much of the interest in social capital among 
economists has been fuelled by a defi nition that includes not only the structure of networks and social 
relations, but more individualistic behavioural dispositions and macro-institutional measures (‘rule of law’, 
‘contract enforceability’ and ‘civil liberties’). 
CENTRE FOR ABORIGINAL ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH
DISCUSSION PAPER N0. 261 5
The ‘panopoly of micro and macro measures of “social capital”—and their corresponding eclectic theoretical 
frameworks—has led many critics to accuse social capital of being all things to all people (and hence nothing 
to anyone)’ (Woolcock 2001). One strategy to address this criticism has been to refer to macro-institutional 
issues under a separate banner, calling them instead ‘social capabilities’, ‘social cohesion’ and ‘social 
infrastructure’. This has the advantage of making social capital more analytically tractable and resolves 
disciplinary tensions within the social capital literature. 
Another approach has been to advocate a leaner conceptualisation of social capital that focuses on sources 
of social capital (i.e. networks), rather than on consequences such as trust, tolerance, and cooperation (see 
Woolcock 2001). Before providing a critical appraisal it is important to briefl y outline the various streams of 
thought in social capital theory. 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 229) describe several conceptualisations of social capital. The communitarian
perspective equates social capital with such local organisations as clubs, associations, and civic groups. 
However, evidence from the developing world demonstrates why merely having high levels of social 
solidarity or of informal groupings does not necessarily lead to economic prosperity (Woolcock & Narayan 
2000: 230). 
The networks view of social capital stresses the ‘importance of vertical as well as horizontal associations 
between people and of relations within and among such organisational entities as community groups 
and fi rms’ (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 230). The networks view is particularly relevant in the Indigenous 
context as social capital conceived in this way can have negative consequences with considerable claims 
on a member’s sense of obligation and commitment. Indeed, group loyalties can be so strong that they 
isolate members from information about employment opportunities, foster a climate of ridicule towards 
efforts to study and work hard, or siphon off hard-won assets (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 231). Woolcock 
and Narayan (2000: 232) provide a diagram that illustrates how the relationship between social capital and 
poverty transitions depends on the balance of emphasis on bonding and bridging social capital.
The institutional view of social capital emphasises the role of political, legal and institutional environment 
in determining the vitality of community networks and civil society (Woolcock & Narayan 2000: 234–5). In 
the context of Australia, notions of civility are largely defi ned in terms of ‘white’ society. Note that even if 
certain macro aspects of social capital are syphoned off under the banner of ‘social capabilities’, a strategy 
referred to in Woolcock (2001), there is still a role for institutional factors to explain the effi cacy of social 
networks in achieving certain goals. One issue for the institutional view is that it can lack a micro foundation 
to its theoretical perspective. This is not to say that macro aspects of social capital are not valid, rather that 
such aspects can be diffi cult to reconcile with micro perspectives. 
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Woolcock and Narayan (2000) advocate a synergy view that combines the institutional and network
approaches to social capital. They dismiss the diffi culties in reconciling the macro and micro aspects of these 
two largely competing views of social capital. They suggest that the central task for policy analysis is to show 
how to transform situations where a community’s social capital substitutes for weak, hostile, or indifferent 
formal institutions into situations in which both realms complement one another. While this is a laudable 
goal, it is easier said than done. 
Having outlined the concepts underlying the broad streams of social capital theory, it is important to 
remember that the term is itself controversial. Many economists, including the author of this paper, see 
the growing literature on social capital as an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy (e.g., Solow 
2000: 8).4 Arrow (2000) urges the abandonment of the metaphor of capital and the term ‘social capital’. 
To neo-classical economists, the term capital implies three aspects: usage over time, deliberate sacrifi ce 
of the present for future benefi ts, and alienability. The fi rst aspect may hold in part in terms of building a 
reputation or a trust relation. But these are not like a physical investment; a little trust is almost useless. 
Social capital certainly fails to meet the second part of Arrow’s (2000) defi nition of capital. The essence of 
social networks is that they are built up for reasons other than their economic value to the participants. 
Indeed, this is what gives them their value in monitoring the group members. For example, the information 
from social networks about individual members or their actions is only credible to the extent that the group’s 
trust has not been compromised by internal competition for economic resources.5
Social capital certainly should not be called ‘capital’ if the defi nition demands that it must be either 
alienable or portable (Arrow 2000). Even if you introduce someone into a group, it may not possible be to 
transfer the trust of others to this third party. However, the condition of portability may be too strong given 
that education or ‘human capital’ is not transferable. The presence of irreversible investments means that 
even physical capital could fail this overly restrictive defi nition.
THEORETICAL CONCERNS ABOUT ‘SOCIAL’ CAPITAL 
In a recent Fabian Society pamphlet, Christopher Scanlon documents several criticisms of social capital and 
summarised as follows:
In short, social capital is an attempt to have relations of trust, reciprocity, tolerance and mutual 
obligation without having to bother too much about the deeper cultural mooring points to which those 
relations are tied … Social capital is thus an expression of cultural contradiction, an attempt to realise 
a particular social ethic but in a form that comprehensively undermines the deeper cultural grounds 
within which that ethic takes root (2004: BB3).
While I share some of Scanlon’s views, his pamphlet tends to overstate the case. For example, the use of 
the term social capital does not automatically make people ‘unwitting dupes lending legitimacy to a larger 
project’ of neo-liberal market-driven ideology (Scanlon 2004: BB4). A more prudent and accurate way of 
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expressing a similar sentiment is that the poorly integrated and under-theorised nature of social capital 
literature may lend itself to disingenuous uses of the concept. 
Scanlon does however, make good use of quotes from Karl Marx to illustrate that: ‘particular objects like 
land, machinery and money are under certain circumstances capital, but are not capital in themselves. It 
is only when they enter into particular social relations that they function as capital’ (2004: BB4). In a sense, 
the term social capital is tautological for a Marxist.6
One weakness of social capital theory is that it is largely formulated without reference to social class. In 
describing the structures of power, Max Weber describes the ‘factor that creates “class” is unambiguous 
economic interest’ (Gerth & Wright Mills 1970). It is hard to conceive of a change in the network that does 
not affect economic interest, and hence the failure to take explicit account of class is a signifi cant failing 
of the social capital literature.
It is possible that if social capital is truly a public good (i.e. it is non-rivalrous and non-excludable), as some 
commentators appear to think, then class interests may not be affected by augmentations and fl uctuations 
in social capital for a particular group. However, the vehement reaction of many propertied groups in the 
debate on native title illustrates that such groups feel threatened by the perceived competition for ‘their’ 
[sic] land—class interest still exists in Australia. For Indigenous Australians at least, the historical exclusion 
from ‘elites’ and mainstream ‘power structures’ need to be addressed before tinkering with social networks. 
Mancur Olson (1965) suggested that elites got together to boost the prospect for political advantage. Note 
that Olson analysed the logic of collective action within a context of individually oriented objectives using a 
game theoretic framework, and hence his work is not necessarily compatible with collective interpretations 
of social capital or class analysis (e.g. Marxist interpretations). 
There is nothing that necessarily precludes social capital from being located within a more comprehensive 
view of collective action. Indeed, it could be argued that the synergy perspective attempts to do just that. The 
main problem is the extent to which this form of social capital theory can be tested or measured empirically. 
Put another way, since empirical analysis must hold certain things constant to be operationalised, the 
question must be asked whether a ‘multifaceted’ and ‘lightly-defi ned’ social capital theory controls for 
enough factors to be distinguished from competing theoretical perspectives. 
Discrimination against Indigenous Australians is possibly a special form of social competition based on racial 
characteristics. Hunter (2004) illustrates that the scope for labour market discrimination against Indigenous 
Australians is enormous, with discrimination being more likely to occur in the process of securing and 
retaining employment rather than in the wage setting process. From a social capital perspective, addressing 
discrimination requires that non-Indigenous social and economic networks need to be more open to the 
Indigenous population. Arrow (1998) postulates that social segregation may give rise to labour market 
segregation if local social networks are used for job referrals. In such circumstances, discrimination may 
not have costs for the employers, and may actually reward discrimination if social networks are suffi ciently 
‘dense’.
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However, there are many competing theories of discrimination that do not necessarily use networks or social 
capital to explain the phenomenon. Employers that persist in discriminating could be said to be indulging a 
taste for discrimination (see Arrow 1998). Statistical discrimination—where employers who believe that one 
group has a lower average productivity than other workers use membership of the group as ‘information’ in 
hiring workers—has the potential to be more persistent if labour market segregation reinforces the belief in 
racial differences. If the group that is discriminated against is relatively small, these employers’ beliefs are 
not challenged by the facts.7
Even if one believes that social capital, and access to social networks have certain characteristics usually 
associated with public goods (or more accurately a ‘club goods’—see Ancil 1991), there may be indirect 
avenues for class interests to assert themselves. Social status is a relative phenomenon with classes being 
somewhat fl uid, and is partially determined by current consumption. 
In his seminal work The Social Limits to Growth, Fred Hirsch (1976: 2) argued that ‘as the level of average 
consumption rises, an increasing portion of consumption takes on a social as well as an individual aspect’. 
One of the social aspects of consumption that Hirsch was concerned about was that of status-seeking, in 
which individuals use consumption as a means of achieving social status (i.e. by the consumption of what he 
defi ned as ‘positional goods’). The importance of such socially constructed goods is their role in explaining 
the observation that, as people become richer, their levels of material frustration do not appear to diminish. 
Since the supply of positional goods is fi xed in Hirsch’s analysis, policy prescription must be directed toward 
reduction of positional demand. For example, social resources will be wasted competing for positional goods 
such as homes in ‘good’ suburbs.8
Social capital theory argues that social context can be an asset for individual and groups, but Hirsch (1976) 
is concerned that social context also affects the acquisition and consumption of goods and services, which 
he asserts has lead to the modern state of ‘commodity fetishism’.9 Other social scientists make similar 
points about the importance of the social and cultural context of consumption (Appadurai 1986; Douglas 
& Isherwood 1978), especially Thorstein Veblen (1902: 68–101) who developed the notion of conspicuous 
consumption. However, the importance of Hirsch’s contribution is in the elaboration of several mechanisms 
by which the consumption used to secure status can be socially wasteful.
Therefore social capital misses one of the major infl uences of social context on individual and societal 
welfare, that competition for positional goods reduces aggregate wellbeing. In the language of social capital, 
to the extent that people are competing for bridging social capital, the resources involved may be wasted 
as the number of people who can have social status is limited. Hirsch’s formulation can be summarised as 
a zero-sum game whereby socially wasteful competition for social status occurs through consumption of 
positional goods. While it may be possible to increase the intensity of involvement of high status people 
in social networks, one must question the extent to which they have incentive to do so since successful 
building of bridging social capital of the socially excluded may diminish their status.10
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Solow (2000) provides a further criticism of the utility of the term social capital. Contracts are almost 
always incomplete and the transaction costs of exchange in the market will be lower, defensive behaviour 
diminished, and economic performance better if the parties can expect each other to be ‘reasonable’ or non-
exploitative. A reputation for trustworthiness in this sense can be highly valuable. While a reputation can 
be built up by repeated exhibitions of trustworthy behaviour in similar circumstances, many economically 
important situations are too anonymous or too idiosyncratic or too rare for reputation building to be a 
useful strategy.
Another theoretical concern is that the rather eclectic theoretical frameworks, and wide variety of defi nitions 
of social capital used, seems to violate Ockham’s razor—the scientifi c principle that in explaining any 
phenomenon, we should use no more explanatory concepts than are absolutely necessary.11 For example, the 
deliberate vagueness of some social capital theorists seems to keep options open for using several concepts 
(at different levels of analysis). While the move towards a leaner version of social capital may be reasonably 
consistent with the famous dictum, the use of multiple levels of analysis leads to substantial problems in our 
ability to measure the concepts underlying social capital theory. 
MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL 
The measurement of the validity of the various conceptualisations of social capital, and other potential 
explanations of the social data, needs to set criteria against which the theory can be assessed. Two or 
more theories are ‘observationally equivalent’ if extant (or even any conceivable) data collections cannot 
distinguish between the competing theories. In a sense, this is a problem for the theory being examined in 
that it is not suffi ciently precise to make accurate predictions about the relationships one would expect to 
fi nd in the data. Researchers combining limited data with different maintained assumptions can, and often 
do, reach different logically valid conclusions (Manski 1995: 3).
A related issue is the identifi cation problem, by which an empirical researcher seeks to characterise the 
conclusions that could be drawn if one could obtain an unlimited number of observations (Manski 1995). 
That is, certain conclusions may not be possible unless strong assumptions are invoked. Notwithstanding, 
Manksi (1995) makes a plea to tolerate ambiguity as the credibility of social science would be higher if 
we were to strive to offer predictions under a range of plausible hypotheses that are consistent with the 
available evidence. Manski’s plea should not be taken as a licence for loose theorising because the plausible 
hypothesis must be clear enough that it can be validly claimed to be consistent with the data. 
Themes like social cohesion, engagement in networks, civic orientation, obligations, or norms of reciprocity 
have a long tradition in social sciences, existing long before the notion of social capital became fashionable 
in the 1990s (Van Deth 2003: 86). One important issue for the use of existing data sets is that they were 
collected and informed by existing (non-social capital) theories, and any attempt to re-interpret the data in 
terms of social capital may be somewhat forced. Consequently, the collection of new data informed by social 
capital theory is vitally important for testing the validity or otherwise of the theory. 
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Scanlon uses health research as an example of the likely diffi culties to be involved in identifying the 
effi cacy or otherwise of social capital: ‘although study after study confi rms a correlation between social 
connectedness and good health, the precise mechanism by which social connectedness impacts on health 
has yet to be identifi ed’ (Scanlon 2004: BB8). Furthermore, to ‘explain the links between social relations and 
positive health outcomes, social capitalists are forced to return to the familiar categories of class, gender, 
race and age’ (Scanlon 2004: BB8). 
Karl Popper (1959) claimed that all theories must be judged ultimately in terms of their falsifi able 
predictions, a position to which many modern economists subscribe (see Blaug 1976: 828). Popper has 
been described as a philosophical Darwinist where the best theory is one that has the greatest explanatory 
power. One implication of the Popperian notion of falsifi ability is that if a hypothesis cannot be falsifi ed 
(e.g. creationism, religion), then it adds nothing to our quantum of knowledge. Given that social capital is 
often motivated in terms of its complementary relationship with human capital, it is interesting that Blaug 
has criticised the falsifi ability of human capital theory and the so-called protective belt of that theory (i.e. 
the auxillary assumptions required to form specifi c testable theories). A useful avenue for future research, 
therefore, is to engage in a robust debate on the extent of falsifi ability of social capital theory. Following 
Popper’s reasoning, qualitative data should be collected in a way to maximise the possibility that the social 
capital hypothesis can be disproved, with case studies being chosen as extreme examples that are more likely 
to be consistent with other theories. 
Given that social capital is a hypothesis that involves multi-level analysis (individual, family, community, and 
society), the main problem for empirical analysis of social capital is intrinsic diffi culties in conducting cross-
level inference. The ecological fallacy (also known as the fallacy of composition) is that the relationships 
within a large group may be different from the theoretical and observed relationships for individuals or 
smaller groups. Since the ecological fallacy was fi rst identifi ed, most methodological discussions have 
focused on modifying the strict prohibition against downward cross-level inference (i.e. the inference from 
data collected for larger units to lower units of analysis).
Firebaugh (1978) shows that the fallacy is only an issue where there are causal group effects or externalities, 
and notes that externalities are most likely to occur in groups where members interact and share relevant 
life experiences. But since social capital theory often involves reference to externalities and public goods, the 
fallacy is an unavoidable issue that needs to be addressed when measuring social capital. 
The obvious strategy is to collect data at several levels but ensure that the basic data are collected at an 
individual level. However, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) (2000) questions whether social capital 
can be measured by aggregating information collected from individuals, especially if it is a property of social 
interactions that they are collective, and therefore cannot be held by individuals. The ABS paper goes on to 
question whether the ABS household surveys are useful means for obtaining such information, especially if 
social capital is measured at the community level. For example, the sample sizes of community (e.g. small 
area or collection district) data in household surveys are rarely large enough to ensure that estimates are 
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reasonably accurate. In spite of such issues, the ABS has gone on to develop data collections for social 
capital, most notably in the General Social Survey and the Indigenous Social Survey (ABS 2004). 
Van Deth (2003) documents the pitfalls of using aggregate measures for collective phenomena. It is more 
diffi cult to develop strategies to measure social capital as a collective, rather an individual, phenomenon. 
While it may be possible to develop collective indicators using individual level data when dealing with some 
aspects of social capital (e.g. the densities of networks), it is more diffi cult where simple aggregation is less 
valid. For example, it is questionable whether aggregate survey data about trust really measure the amount 
of trust available as a collective good for all citizens, as is implied by some social capital theorists (Van Deth 
2003: 87). Either the social capital theory has to clearly specify the relationship between the individual and 
collective aspects, or an attempt has to be made to separately measure the collective phenomenon. 
Given the potential diffi culties in aggregating individual data to estimate data for social groups, the higher 
level data might be estimated ‘directly’ using responses from a representative of a community organisation. 
While this avoids the aggregation issue, it is diffi cult to pin down what the differences between the 
representative response and the aggregated individual responses might mean. That is, do any differences 
in data collected refl ect biases in the representative’s response or inherent problems in the aggregation 
procedure used? 
One of the strengths of social capital theory is it provides an explanation for local contexts. However, this 
also implies a contextual dependency whereby it may be hard to develop standardised identical measures. 
Consequently, it is necessary to assess the validity of social capital indicators in different settings (cross-
cultural and longitudinal) (Van Deth 2003: 86). This is particularly relevant for Indigenous Australians for 
whom cultural norms are clearly different from other Australians. Even within Indigenous Australia there are 
large variations in cultural practices and social contexts that need to be taken into account. 
Van Deth (2003: 89) also claims that the conceptual heterogeneity of social capital theory is not refl ected in 
a diversity of empirical approaches, at least to the extent that he anticipated. He advocates the use of multi-
method and multi-level strategies to capture the multifaceted nature of social capital. This line of argument 
is reminiscent of the empirical literature that attempts to measure social exclusion (Bradshaw 2003). Given 
the inconclusive nature of the social exclusion literature, this strategy may also be a risky one for social 
capital theory. This notwithstanding, statistical techniques such as cluster analysis and factor analysis may 
prove useful in capturing the important dimensions of social capital (Stone & Hughes 2002). 
Woolcock (2001: 12) emphasises the qualitative aspects of social capital research. At a minimum, the 
construction of survey instruments to measure social capital should follow intensive periods in the fi eld, 
ascertaining the most appropriate way to ask the necessary questions. Qualitative data also needs to be 
collected to ascertain the relative importance of aggregation and other problems with measuring data at 
several levels. 
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This section has discussed the major impediments to accurately measuring social capital. Even though it is 
diffi cult to measure, social capital still may be important. The next section examines several potential roles 
for social capital in addressing ongoing Indigenous disadvantage. 
ADDRESSING INDIGENOUS DISADVANTAGE THROUGH SOCIAL 
CAPITAL? 
Before uncritically importing terms like social capital, it is necessary to analyse how useful these concepts 
are cross-culturally in understanding Indigenous disadvantage. For example, not having any employment in 
the Australian labour market may actually empower many Indigenous peoples to hunt, fi sh, paint and live 
on their traditional land or ‘country’. Indeed, the extra hours of ‘spare’ time may facilitate more extensive 
participation in ceremonial activities, thus increasing what may be defi ned as ‘social capital’ (Hunter 2000).
In addition to such cross-cultural critiques, some forms of employment may actually diminish the extent of 
shared values and trust that may exist among Indigenous groups. Work which involves or leads to frequent 
relocation of the workforce, such as some types of casual or seasonal work, could uproot the worker’s family 
and thus weaken their links to the local community. Clearly, the relationship between social capital and 
Indigenous unemployment is not simple.
Bourdieu (1993: 33) sees the family as the main site of accumulation and transmission of social capital. 
Fukuyama (1999: 17) asserts that ‘families are obviously important sources of social capital everywhere’. 
However, if family ties become too strong, they may crowd out the weaker ties of the community. Allegiance 
is to family and kin and trust may not extend beyond the bounds of the extended family. In some cases, 
there appears to be something of an inverse relationship between the bonds of trust and reciprocity 
inside and outside the family; when one is very strong the other tends to be very weak. Such hypotheses 
notwithstanding, in the context of Indigenous Australia the notion of family and community are not clearly 
defi ned and therefore empirical studies of social capital will have diffi culties in using family data to test the 
theory (Morphy 2002).
Much of the social capital literature, especially that informed by the communitarian view, has focused on 
the positive outcomes associated with high levels of social capital and sought to explain social problems 
as an outcome of diminishing social capital stock (Putnam 1995, 1996). However, social capital may have 
negative effects on some parties (see Putzel 1997).12 As argued above, a gain for some through the use of 
social capital may be a loss, or potential loss, for others. 
The family played a central role in Indigenous societies in the pre-colonial era (Dodson 1994: 34). However, 
colonisation disrupted almost all aspects of Aboriginal life, redefi ning the way Indigenous people went about 
meeting their basic needs. The nature and volume of social exchanges changed considerably and resulted in 
a shift away from self-reliance (autonomy) to dependency. Many social functions that had previously been 
performed within the Aboriginal community were displaced by the state or the market. State interventions 
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in Indigenous family life may have also removed the cultural foundations on which social capital grew. 
For example, the dislocation of Indigenous people from their traditional lands and the forced removal of 
children from their families had a profound effect on the social exchanges carried out within the Aboriginal 
family (Commonwealth of Australia 1997).
It is important to note that the social capital of Indigenous Australians is defi ned by their relationship with 
the rest of society. Ian Winter argues that: 
if sameness has been forced upon one group by colonisation or other forms of oppression, then neither 
group (Indigenous or non-Indigenous) has much capacity to trust the other. The colonisers fear resistance 
and anger; the colonised fear domination and destruction of their cultures and ways of life (2000: 46).
Furthermore, Winter postulates that the oral cultures of Indigenous communities tell too many stories of 
betrayal and bad faith for the present generations to do anything but distrust governments, churches, other 
groupings and organisations and many individuals. 
Fig. 1.  A sociological perspective on the dynamics of social capital
Source: Adapted from Portes (1998: 8).
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Several recent initiatives attempt, more or less consciously, to develop Indigenous people’s social capital. As 
an example, Winter (2000: 149) cites the Body Shop’s involvement with the Balkanu Corporation designed 
at enabling Indigenous people to learn business skills, as well as enabling non-Indigenous business people 
to attempt to gain a greater understanding of contemporary Aboriginal culture. However, such initiatives 
tend to unquestioningly import the notion of social capital without asking whether the theory needs to be 
modifi ed to be relevant to Indigenous Australians. 
Portes (1998) defi ned four (sociological) sources of social capital (see Fig. 1). They are value introjection, 
bounded solidarity, reciprocity of exchanges, and enforceable trust. Each of these will be examined briefl y 
with reference to the circumstances in which Indigenous Australians fi nd themselves.
Value introjection is a source of social capital that comes from shared values or cultural beliefs. Berndt 
and Berndt (1988) identify the heterogeneous nature of Indigenous Australia but maintain that there are 
commonalities across social groups. One such commonality that has survived colonisation is the importance 
of kin in everyday life. Schwab (1991) in his work on the Nunga people in South Australia shows that 
Aboriginality is constructed in the form of an ideology he calls the Blackfella Way. Note that what Schwab 
calls symbolic capital could also be called social capital: 
The Blackfella way is an ideological system which provides an avenue for Aboriginal actors in Adelaide 
to accumulate capital in a symbolic form, for example, by living up to the obligations of generosity and 
sharing implied in that system. Later, that symbolic capital can be transformed into economic capital 
‘at call’ since the corollary to the obligation of generosity is the right to respect reciprocal generosity in 
times of need (Schwab 1991: 35)
Bounded solidarity is another source of social capital springing from like people being in like circumstances. 
Certainly this source of social capital would have existed before colonisation but it would have gained 
importance in the post-colonial period. Finlayson (1991) describes a cycle of feast and famine in the Kuranda 
Indigenous community of North Queensland. In this welfare dependent community, household expenditure is 
linked with the welfare payment week so that resources are scarce in the days leading up to ‘pay day’. During 
this time resources are shared more widely, thereby lessening the adverse impact of fi nancial deprivation.
The third source of social capital mentioned by Portes is the reciprocity of exchanges. Berndt and Berndt 
(1988) describe the reciprocal nature of exchanges in traditional Indigenous society. Schwab (1995) also 
looks at sharing and reciprocity in Aboriginal families and says that sharing is based on demand, but 
constrained by a delicate balance between what it is appropriate to demand and what it is appropriate to 
refuse. If excessive or unreasonable demands are to be denied, then strategic behaviour must be adopted so 
that neither party is shamed or embarrassed. 
The fi nal source of social capital mentioned by Portes is that of enforceable trust. This is the mechanism that 
maintains the reciprocal obligations and social norms existing within an Indigenous community. The ability 
to share is a direct expression of Aboriginality, with enforceable trust benefi ting both the recipient (in the 
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form of access to resources) and the donor (in the form of group approval). Trust exists in these situations 
because the obligation to share is enforceable through the power of the community.
Fig. 1 also documents both the positive and negative consequences of social capital. The fi rst positive effect 
of social capital is its impact on social control. Sources of this type of social capital are often found in 
bounded solidarity or enforceable trust. Here, the community acts as an informal disciplinary mechanism 
that maintains social control through the threat of community action. 
The second positive effect of social capital is that it is a source of family support. As outlined earlier, 
sharing is still a common feature in Indigenous kin networks. Indeed, it is a medium by which an individual’s 
Aboriginality can be expressed. Sharing is recognised as a direct means of family support by cushioning 
the impact of fi nancial constraints through the distribution of collective resources (monetary and non-
monetary). 
The fi nal positive effect of social capital is that it secures network-mediated benefi ts beyond the immediate 
family. The social capital described above is limited in this regard: it does not appear to provide increased 
access to education, employment, or fi nancial resources that can be used in a productive manner. In other 
words, the network does not extend signifi cantly into mainstream society.
Portes’ review also teases out the four major negative consequences of social capital. They are the exclusion 
of outsiders, excessive claims on group members, restrictions on the freedom of individuals, and the 
downward levelling of norms.
The exclusion of outsiders may be problematic in Indigenous communities, but for reasons different to those 
described by Portes. He asserts that the exclusion of outsiders is a problem because it restricts benefi ts to 
those within the group. However, in the case of Indigenous Australians the exclusion of outsiders prevents 
adequate service provision, especially in the areas of education and health: it restricts benefi ts from reaching 
the group.
The second possible negative effect of social capital, that of excessive claims on group members, is quite 
prevalent in Indigenous societies today. Schwab (1995) notes that despite the philosophy of reciprocity 
espoused by many Indigenous Australians, generosity does not fl ow from recognition of need, it is more 
often demanded. It is this notion of ‘demand sharing’, supported through obligatory relationships, that can 
lead to excessive claims on some group members. 
Family solidarity may impose restrictions on the freedom of individuals. Here, norm observance, or acting 
within predetermined cultural parameters, may restrict personal freedoms. An example of this was given in 
the section on reciprocity of exchanges: when a demand for resources is denied there are fi nancial and social 
consequences.
The fi nal negative effect identifi ed by Portes is what he calls a downward levelling of norms. Portes cites 
examples of Haitian-American youth in Miami and Mexican-American youth in Southern California, where a 
downward levelling of norms has been preceded by a lengthy period of restricted mobility caused by outside 
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discrimination. Within these two groups in the United States, expectations about future life course become 
a self-fulfi lling prophecy, limiting education and employment prospects. These reductions in expectations 
are often associated with socially unacceptable codes of conduct. 
A similar situation currently exists for Indigenous Australians. It serves to increase the solidarity of group 
members and reinforce the exclusion of outsiders. Downward levelling of norms can impact indirectly 
though the failure to see the value in gaining further education and in diminishing the skill acquisition that 
facilitates entry into the labour market. 
Note that the downward levelling of norms may also result from external sources, with others expecting 
less from Indigenous people because they are perceived to belong to a dysfunctional group. Consequently, 
statistical discrimination may have a role in explaining the negative effects of social capital. 
Bounded solidarity and enforceable trust can lead in some circumstances to negative social outcomes and a 
deteriorating level of social control. The abuse of alcohol in Indigenous communities has vast implications 
for the intergenerational transfer of cultural norms and the impact on mechanisms of social control (Martin 
1998). Aboriginal people themselves are aware of the problem and consequences of alcohol abuse—indeed, 
the concern about excessive alcohol use was raised in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in 
Custody and also identifi ed in the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS). Almost 
three-quarters of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders reported alcohol as a substance abuse problem within 
their household (ABS 1995: 22).
The so-called ‘dark side’ [sic] of social capital is important and needs to be understood (Putzel 1997). When 
interpreting social capital variables in the context of Indigenous disadvantage and prolonged unemployment, 
it is important to be aware how some indicators of social capital may act to reinforce the restrictions on 
individual opportunity and lower the aspirations of many Indigenous people. 
Social capital theory is articulated at a level abstract enough to encompass the experiences of many 
Indigenous Australians. Ironically, it is the under-theorised nature of social capital, rather than a lack of 
data, which is the major impediment to empirical analysis. The social capital literature, at least as described 
by Portes, provides a detailed framework for understanding the social processes, but does little to further 
our understanding of why such processes could be described as ‘capital’. Unless more attention is paid to 
modelling exactly how these social exchanges add economic value to (or subtract it from) individuals or 
groups, then the term social capital is little more than a metaphor. People undoubtedly will try to use the 
social structure as a resource to further their interests, but the concept of social capital lacks analytical 
content and does not provide an adequate model of how this might be achieved. 
The past two centuries have led to a widespread degeneration in the social and economic fabric in which 
Indigenous Australians are enmeshed. Many policy initiatives to enhance Indigenous development are at odds 
with local Indigenous practice and values, thus limiting the prospect for ‘sustainable’ development outcomes 
(Smith 2003). Further, where there is an engagement with the ‘cultural’ in Indigenous development, its scope 
is almost always limited to the ‘Aboriginal domain’. The relevance of cultural analysis for the operation of 
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local Aboriginal corporations, the rationales of development projects and the role of regional organisations 
themselves are generally ignored. Smith (2003) illustrates that cultural considerations fundamentally affect 
the sustainability of development initiatives by examining a series of projects undertaken in central Cape 
York Peninsula since the mid 1990s. The outcomes of these projects are shaped by both the social and 
institutional context of development projects, especially the presumptions of a number of local Aboriginal 
‘community’ and other agencies.13 Social capital may have some role to play in disentangling the roles of 
social, cultural and institutional context, but is not possible to discount the ability of competing theoretical 
frameworks to explain Smith’s account. 
Daly and Smith conclude by exploring the implications for children of exclusion from one sphere of life 
(i.e. the mainstream economy), for their inclusion in the other (i.e. the Indigenous sphere). They suggest 
somewhat provocatively that:
exclusion from mainstream economic participation may be actively undermining Indigenous families’ 
own capacity to reproduce culturally valued relationships and roles. If that is the case, then key aspects 
of Indigenous cultural wellbeing and social reproduction may be directly linked to breaking the cycle of 
inter-generational welfare dependency and economic exclusion that is being transmitted to Indigenous 
children (2003: v). 
Furthermore, Daly and Smith claim there is a two-way dynamic, where causal factors that are generating 
exclusion in one domain interact with factors in other overlapping domains (2003: 18).14 This is especially the 
case for Indigenous people who are engaged in a ‘hybrid economy’ where Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
components and behaviours are now tightly interlocked (see Altman 2002). In a sense, the lack of bridging 
social capital acts to compound and generate consequences that rebound within and across domains. 
Sutherland (2003) motivates her call for a whole-of-government approach within an Indigenous school in 
the ACT in terms of both the ‘learning community’ and social capital literature.15 While she convincingly 
demonstrates the need to cultivate and nurture Indigenous trust in educational institutions, Sutherland’s 
position can be justifi ed using other theoretical perspectives, including class based analysis. 
Notwithstanding the overall limitations of the social capital literature, there are several examples of 
mechanisms by which social networks could potentially augment economic value for Indigenous Australians. 
McDonnell (1999) explores the possibility that micro-credit institutions in Indigenous communities may 
correct for certain market failures in banking services in remote areas through the use of dense Indigenous 
social networks to monitor individual behaviour. 
Another possible example is that labour market studies point to ‘friends and relatives’ as being the most 
heavily utilised method of job search among Indigenous and other Australian youth (Gray & Hunter 2000; 
Heath 1999). If the social networks of Indigenous people are confi ned to unemployed and other socially 
excluded individuals, then this search method is unlikely to be of much assistance in fi nding a job. Expressing 
this in a more positive way, if the social capital of Indigenous youth can be developed to extend their 
networks into the labour force, there are likely then to be signifi cant gains in Indigenous employment. 
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In summary, the introduction of the term social capital may have marginally contributed to the debate 
about Indigenous disadvantage. However, unless there is a critical engagement with the concept, and an 
examination of the ability of social capital research to empirically demonstrate the importance of the social 
and institutional context of Indigenous poverty, these gains will be dissipated by those who seek to justify a 
particular position with disingenuous rhetoric. The concluding section refl ects on the extent to which social 
capital is useful for analysing Indigenous disadvantage. 
CAN THE SOCIAL CAPITAL HYDRA BE TAMED?
It is pertinent to remember that the Hydra in Greek mythology protected the Lernaean cave for the goddess 
Hera. Extending the metaphor at the beginning of this paper further, the concept of social capital may 
also be useful in protecting the status quo in the modern era. For example, as most Indigenous people 
place a great deal of emphasis on kin relationships, it may be relatively easy for them to interpret social 
capital literature in their own cultural and linguistic terms. However, while some disadvantaged people fi nd 
some resonance in the notion of social capital, they are unlikely to be talking about the same concept as 
prominent politicians, including Australia’s Prime Minister (John Howard), and other senior politicans (e.g. 
Peter Costello and Mark Latham). The lack of clarity in the conceptualisation of social capital Hydra is what 
makes it potentially dangerous.
This paper has attempted to argue for a more modest conceptualisation of social capital that is amenable to 
empirical analysis, and hence can be used as a basis for useful policy advice. A clearly formulated theory of 
social networks is rather like the gold hidden away in the Hydra’s head—it is dangerous to procure but may 
be ultimately worthwhile.
In aspiring to a more precise defi nition of social capital, I am not seeking to ignore the broader social and 
institutional context. Indeed, I believe it is important to recognise that power structures inform the meaning 
and organisation of social relationships (see also Bourdieu 1986, 1993). However, the point is that social 
capital must have theoretical content that is both distinguishable from other theories and empirically 
measurable. 
For Popper, all scientifi c criticism must be piecemeal—that is, he holds that it is not possible to question every 
aspect of a theory at once (1963). More precisely, while attempting to resolve a particular problem a scientist 
necessarily accepts all kinds of things as unproblematic. Popper develops his notion of verisimilitude to deal 
with theories which are at best approximations (1963: 235). This is often the case in the social sciences, and 
is clearly true for social capital theory. Verisimilitude describes the incremental movement towards theories 
with the greatest truth-value. 
At this early stage of development of social capital theory, the best strategy is to formulate hypotheses 
that are clearly falsifi able. Unfortunately, the diffi culties in operationalising tests of multi-level hypotheses 
means that the more powerful tests of the theory will be conducted at either the individual or aggregate 
levels, but not a combination of both. The incremental insights gained into the processes underlying social 
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capital from carefully constructed empirical tests of the theory (and hence a convergence towards ‘better’ 
theories through the Popperian process of verisimilitude), should eventually allow a multi-level social capital 
theory to be constructed on a less ad hoc basis than is currently the case. This strategy is not without risk 
because it may lead to the rejection of a ‘true’ hypothesis if there is a signifi cant correlation between the 
single-level and multiple-level effects. However, if such correlations are second order issues, as I believe 
they are, then focusing on data for individuals will maximise the prospect for rejecting hypotheses without 
substantial truth-value. 
It is diffi cult to think of a single prediction arising from social capital theory that is falsifi able. For example, 
given that bonding social capital can have positive and negative consequences, to the extent that all people 
have such networks, it is possible that ‘investments’ in social networks may not yield additional economic 
resources. An even more telling point is that the more complex the account of social capital, the more room 
there is for ad hoc rationalisation of outcomes that contradict any predictions of the theory. The more scope 
there is for institutional and multi-level infl uences, the easier it is to explain apparent contradictions of the 
theory. While falsifi ability is something to aspire to, it may be unreasonable to expect a wide-ranging theory 
such as social capital to embrace it. However, in such circumstances it is valid to question whether social 
capital has more in common with a religion than a scientifi c endeavour. 
There is another avenue for social capital to become useful. Just as Heracles dipped his arrows in the Hydra’s 
entrails to help him defeat his enemy, it may be possible to kill off the more naïve applications of neoclassical 
theory, and (largely third-world) development analysis, to fourth-world people such as Indigenous Australians. 
That is, the debate about theoretical and empirical issues, as well as the cross-cultural appropriateness of the 
social capital concept, will advance the debate on how to address Indigenous disadvantage by helping us to 
reject unsustainable arguments.
Australia’s Productivity Commission (2003) suggests some policy ideas to build or support social capital 
because of the tendency towards under-provision within the community if provision is left to private efforts 
alone. While some of the Commission’s suggestions may ultimately prove useful, it is probably premature to 
move on the policy suggestions until further theoretical and empirical work is conducted. 
The Productivity Commission (2003: 56) recognised that people or societies could ‘over-invest’ in social 
capital because the expenditure of effort to form social capital precludes the expenditure of that same 
effort on other matters. For example, beyond some point, additional time spent networking may eat unduly 
into time spent working or looking for work. Social capital is obviously not a panacea, and more of it is 
not necessarily better. This observation is particularly relevant in the context of Indigenous Australians for 
whom the composition of social networks is likely to be crucially important. For Indigenous Australians the 
most productive research strategy would be to focus on the role of networks in the process of social capital 
formation, before developing a more grand theory of Indigenous social capital that encompasses multiple 
levels of analysis. 
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NOTES
1. The Hydra was a monster that was reared by the goddess Hera as a menace to the hero Heracles. Heracles forced 
the Hydra to emerge by pelting it with burning arrows, and then held his breath while he caught hold of it. He 
set alight one corner of a grove of sacred plane-tree in order to prevent the Hydra growing new heads (by searing 
their roots with blazing branches). Heracles then severed the immortal head with a sword, and buried it still 
hissing. He disembowelled the carcass and dipped his arrows in the gall so that the least wound from one of them 
was invariably fatal.
2. Hercules was the Roman equivalent of Heracles.
3. Also see Portes (1998), who believes that due to the growth in popularity of the term, and the broad range of 
settings to which it is now applied, social capital is at risk of losing any distinct meaning.
4. The naked appeal to authority by the use of the word capital is ironic given a history of controversy of how to 
measure the value of physical capital (e.g. the Cambridge controversy of the 1960s, see Harcourt 1972).
5. Labour or supplier turnover in response to prices may destroy the willingness to offer trust or, more generally, 
to invest in the future of the relation. This leads to an important long-standing question: whether the market 
(or for that matter a large, effi cient, bureaucratic state) destroys social links that have positive implications for 
effi ciency.
6. This point was also made by Fine (2001: 26), who notes capital is always already social, and thus the notion of 
‘social capital’ is tautological.
7. Schelling (1978) provided a model of how segregation can arise from small differences in preferences and persist 
for prolonged periods. While his model was aimed at the housing market it is easy to adapt it to explain the 
tendency for segregated labour markets. 
8. Suburban living of a given quality characteristic is a positional good limited in absolute availability by the context 
of surrounding conditions and infl uences (Hirsch 1976: 41).
9. Orthodox economic analysis is concerned with the commodities people have, not with the way people get them. 
For example, the arguments of a neoclassical utility function are not affected by the social, cultural or historical 
contexts. Hirsch illustrates his point with the graphic example that ‘bought sex is not the same’ (1976: 87).
10. Another issue is the physical and emotional limitation of the individual to actively engage in social networks. 
This is a social networks analogy to ‘bounded rationality’—the fact that most individuals have a limited cognitive 
ability, which means that they fail to live up to the ideal of homo economicus in neo-classical models. 
11. William of Ockham was an English monk, philosopher, and theologian who provided the scientifi c method with its 
key principle 700 years ago. 
12. Putnam’s (1993) work on Italian regions has provided the oft-cited example of the Mafi a drawing heavily on 
particular forms of social capital to produce positive outcomes for those in the ‘family’, but potentially negative 
outcomes for those on the outside.
13. In a discussion of the mutual obligation in Indigenous policy, David Martin (2001: 12) also argues that social and 
economic policy cannot be abstracted from particular networks and communities and from a commitment to 
particular values and locales.
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14. Many Indigenous children are facing a double jeopardy. First, they are at high risk of entrenched exclusion from 
the future benefi ts and opportunities of mainstream economic participation. Secondly, as a direct spillover from 
that, they are experiencing barriers in actively participating in areas of their own Indigenous social and cultural 
institutions. Entrenched exclusion from the mainstream economy is arguably reproducing a form of exclusion in 
another domain—the Indigenous.
15. Sutherland is probably overly sanguine about the positive aspects of social capital generated within an Indigenous 
school, in that she does not explicitly acknowledge the possibility that excessive bonding social capital may 
have negative consequences (e.g. downward levelling of norms) in terms of people’s ability to engage with the 
mainstream economic system. This notwithstanding, her argument is driven by the fact that bonding social capital 
is crucial for building a sustainable and healthy Indigenous community. 
22 HUNTER
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